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A DIVIDED COMMUNITY:  
THE EFFECTS OF STATE FISCAL 
CRISES ON NONPROFITS 




The nonprofit sector and federal and state governments depend on one another, especially 
in the area of health and social services.  Governments rely on nonprofits to provide 
services, and nonprofits rely on governments to fund their operations.  The current fiscal 
crisis in the states, however, poses threats to some nonprofits.  States have acquired 
greater flexibility in recent years with expanded choices under Medicaid and the block-
granting of major social programs, such as Temporary Assistance for Needy Families 
(TANF) and the Child Care and Development Fund (CCDF).  While this flexibility 
allowed states to expand the range of services provided to people during prosperous 
times, it also gave states more options to choose from in making cuts during periods of 
fiscal stress.  The consequence may be a more intense competition for resources, a 
competition pitting a wide range of programs and major policy areas against one another, 
including medical assistance, income supports, and a wide variety of nonhealth social 
services.  
This paper examines the current state revenue crisis, demand for social services, the 
distribution of social assistance nonprofits, and both long-run and short-run changes in 
state expenditures to estimate the effects of state fiscal crises on the nonprofit sector 
associated with human service programs.  This study finds divisions among nonprofits 
that affect the severity of these effects.  These divisions are both functional and 
geographic: 
1. Nonprofits with and without access to Medicaid funding.    Medicaid spending 
increased substantially in nearly all states through the 1990s.  It has continued to 
grow, even during the recession.  Other social assistance spending has 
experienced slower growth and has been cut in some places and for some 
functions.  Thus, nonprofit organizations that can draw on Medicaid dollars are in 
a much better position than other nonprofits. 
2. States of high and low fiscal capacity.  Nonprofits in states with low fiscal 
capacity, based on their per capita personal income, have been more vulnerable to 
the fiscal crisis than those in states with high fiscal capacity states: 
a. States with high fiscal capacity have seen sharp declines in tax revenue in 
recent years, but these drops came after astonishing revenue increases 
partly due to capital gains during the 1990s.  Cash assistance rolls have not 
risen in rich states.  Their spending on nonassistance services under TANF 
has continued to rise through early 2003.  Nonprofits in rich states are not 
as dependent on government for revenue.  Finally, human service budgets 
in rich states are more balanced across health and nonhealth expenditures. 
b. Very different developments are found in states with low fiscal capacity.  
They have seen significant increases in human needs, putting pressures on 
both nonprofits and governments.  Cash assistance rolls and expenditures 
on basic assistance have begun to rise.  At the same time, Medicaid has 
become an even larger portion of social program budgets in poor states, as 
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spending on this program grows as fast or faster than in richer states.  In 
some cases, Medicaid is protected from budget cuts, leaving other social 
welfare programs very vulnerable during a fiscal downturn, especially 
since nonprofits in poorer states rely more heavily on public funding than 
those in wealthier states. 
At the level of individual programs outside the health area, we note that states are 
especially likely to cut programs that are not targeting core or mandated constituencies or 
that provide services viewed as logically essential to achievement of basic program goals 
or performance standards.  For example, many child care subsidies have been cut back to 
cover only TANF cash recipients or people who have recently left welfare—the groups 
most directly involved in TANF’s performance requirements.  Fatherhood programs, 
after-school programs, youth services, some job services, and programs that are not 
viewed as critical in the short-run to moving targeted clients into jobs or keeping them 
there are also more likely to be cut or eliminated.  
Financial pressures on social assistance programs in states with low fiscal capacity are 
likely to continue for some years.  First, although many states have been able to avoid 
major cuts to social assistance programs because of the surpluses they have generated in 
their TANF funds, these funds are being depleted quickly.  Second, poor states tend to 
rely more on sales taxes, which will probably not recover quickly.  Thirdly, the elderly 
population is increasing in size, especially in relatively poor southern and western states, 
and this will increase Medicaid spending.  Finally, federal policy changes, such as the 
recent federal tax cuts and unfunded mandates, will increase fiscal stress on all states for 
years to come. 
The findings from this study suggest many questions for further analysis.  One study 
might continue to explore micro-level choices regarding which programs to preserve and 
which to cut.  Another might examine how nonprofits in the human services area have 
responded to the fiscal crisis, including strategies of advocacy and reorganization.  One 
important analysis would be aimed at developing a plan for tracking federal and state 
spending, at the state and even city level, in ways that are useful to different nonprofits.  
Still another study could focus on how private sources of funding for nonprofit services 
relate to the trends and geographical patterns found in the public sector.  Finally, a study 
could examine the effects of fiscal crisis on whether states and local governments are 
expanding, contracting, or reforming privatization initiatives.
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A DIVIDED COMMUNITY: 
THE EFFECTS OF STATE FISCAL CRISES ON NONPROFITS 
PROVIDING HEALTH AND SOCIAL ASSISTANCE 
By 
Thomas Gais, Courtney Burke, and Rebecca Corso 
 
Fiscal stress in the states has not always threatened spending on social programs and the 
many nonprofit organizations used to deliver services.  As recently as the late 1980s, 
major social programs—such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and 
Medicaid—were typically entitlements that were closely linked to one another and whose 
basic parameters changed little in the short-run at the state level.  Given these fairly fixed 
benefit levels and eligibility criteria, bad economic times pushed up spending on social 
programs by expanding the eligible populations, and if nonprofits were delivering the 
services, such organizations might do well.1  
A lot has changed in the last decade and a half, however, and it is reasonable to be 
concerned about how budgets for such programs are faring now and about the effects of 
spending changes on nonprofits providing social services.  States face the fiscal crisis 
starting in 2001 with more choices than they had in the past.  They have acquired greater 
flexibility since the 1980s in the largest of all social programs, Medicaid; and they have 
acquired an enormous range of options in the benefits and services they provide and the 
people they may serve since the mid-1990s with the enactment, expansion, or amendment 
of Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the Child Care Development Fund 
(CCDF), the Workforce Investment Act, the Welfare-to-Work Block Grant, and other 
programs.  These potential choices mean that states may expand and contract programs as 
their governing coalitions choose, a capacity that not only allows states to adjust their 
programs to changing fiscal conditions but may also create a more intense and wide-
ranging competition for resources in state budget offices, governors’ staffs, 
administrative agencies, and legislatures. 
We argue that state flexibility, competition, and related trends in program spending and 
nonprofits have made some nonprofits, in some states, especially vulnerable to state fiscal 
crises.  In states with low fiscal capacity—as measured by real per capita income—
nonprofit service providers outside the health area may be severely squeezed for 
resources.  This squeeze may be exacerbated by the tendency of many states to exempt 
                                                 
1 For example, in the years between 1987 and 1992 (spanning the U.S. recession of 1990-1991), nonprofits 
delivering nonhealth social services grew in number by a third, from 49,180 to 65,756.  Their revenue 
increased by 70 percent and their receipts from government grew by 97 percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census 
1989; 1996). 
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education, one of the largest expenditures for state governments, from severe budget cuts 
(National Governors Association and the National Association of State Budget Officers 
2003; Finegold, Schardin and Steinbach 2003).  Within the remaining and fairly fixed 
social program pie, both rich and poor states are seeing roughly equal and substantial 
increases in their Medicaid budgets.  As Medicaid spending grows in all states, funding 
streams serving nonprofits outside the health area are highly constrained in poor states.  
These poor states have lower grants (such as TANF) available for services outside of 
health; their cash assistance spending has declined about as much as can be expected and 
may in fact be rising; and other federal grants have been correlated with state wealth. 
Through the first quarter of 2003—the latest spending figures we have available for 
analysis—most states were still drawing down surplus funds or using other methods to 
stave off a severe crunch between expanding healthcare spending and static or slightly 
expanding cash assistance expenditures.  The surpluses are dwindling, however, and 
given the likelihood that fiscal stringencies will continue, we expect the problems of 
funding nonhealth services in states with low fiscal capacity will soon become acute.  
Already we are seeing increases in basic assistance spending among the poor states and 
growing differences between poor and rich states in their support of nonassistance 
programs. 
Compounding the problems for nonprofits, those in the social assistance area—
particularly in states with low fiscal capacity—have increased their dependence on 
government funding in recent decades.  This dependence is even higher in low fiscal 
capacity states.  For these and other reasons, competition for social program resources in 
the current state fiscal crises provides advantages for nonprofits in the health area and in 
high fiscal capacity states—and severe disadvantages for other nonprofits in other states. 
State Fiscal Crises 
The current state revenue crisis has been called “the worst state fiscal crisis since World 
War II.”2  Since state tax revenues began to decline in mid-2001, states have drawn down 
reserve funds, cut spending, and, more recently, increased taxes (Boyd 2003; Jenny 
2003).  But though nearly all states have faced some economic and budgetary stress, the 
mix of demand and supply problems has varied among the states, and these differences 
have shaped the challenges faced by nonprofits in providing social services. 
To understand why the current crisis has been so severe and its impact so varied, we need 
to understand the growth of state revenues in the decade leading up to the current crisis.3  
By any measure, the middle and late 1990s were good for state finances.  Between 1990 
and 2000, nominal state revenues grew 90 percent (32 percent in real per capita terms).  
Some of this growth came from the federal government, as intergovernmental transfers to 
states grew by 119 percent over the decade (51 percent in real per capita dollars).   Yet 
state “own source” revenues, mostly taxes, also grew substantially:  81 percent in 
nominal dollars and 26 percent in real per capita terms. 
                                                 
2 Originally stated by the Chairperson of the National Governor’s Association, Raymond Scheppach.  
3 This discussion of the state fiscal crisis relies heavily on Boyd (2003). 
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Tax revenues in the latter half of the decade benefited from the long economic boom.  
Substantial growth in jobs and earnings—average unemployment remained below 5 
percent from 1997 until the end of 2001—boosted revenues in all states.   However, some 
states benefited from the economic boom more than others.  The extraordinary run-up in 
the stock market, whose value tripled between the end of 1994 and March 2000, led to a 
surge in capital gains.  Growth in tax revenues was especially strong among states that 
relied heavily on corporate and progressive personal income taxes (including capital 
gains) and had many residents with high incomes, such as California, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Massachusetts.  Many of these states enacted large tax cuts in the late 1990s 
(Knight, Kusko, and Rubin 2003).  Despite the cuts, however, state revenues continued to 
rise sharply through mid-2000.  States also benefited from strong personal consumption 
growth and non-recurring sources of revenue, such as the tobacco settlement. 
This growth in revenues also led states to increase their spending by 26 percent between 
1990 and 2000 after adjusting for inflation and population growth.  Virtually all areas of 
state spending increased substantially in the 1990s.  Medicaid dominated state spending 
growth in the first half of the 1990s, while elementary and secondary education played a 
greater role in the second.  Nonetheless, states did not spend themselves into the budget 
crises.  The rate of expenditure growth in the 1990s was neither high nor low in historical 
terms.  It was slower than the growth of the 1960s and 1980s but greater than that of the 
1950s and 1970s.  Expenditures did not grow as fast as revenues, allowing states to build 
their reserve funds to a 20-year high of $48.8 billion, for all states, or 10.4 percent of 
revenues (Springer 2003; Boyd 2003). 
When the economy weakened in 2001, and the stock market began its long decline, the 
conditions generating rapid growth in revenues and expenditures evaporated.  But state 
tax revenue was hit harder than might have been expected.  As Figure 1 (from Boyd 
2003) shows, fiscal year 2002 produced a 7.4 percent decline in real per capita tax 
revenue, more than twice as steep as state tax revenue declines that accompanied the 
1990–91 and “double-dip” 1980–82 recessions.  Yet declines in basic economic 
indicators, such as real GDP per capita, were less severe in 2002 than in the two previous 
recessions.  The sharp losses in state tax revenues were largely a function of the rapid 
drop in capital gains.4  As Donald Boyd noted in a recent paper:  
After stock markets fell for two consecutive years, this surge [in capital gains 
during the 1990s] was followed by a sharp drop of approximately 50 percent in 
2001. The late 1990s’ increase [in capital gains] was unlike any other sustained 
increase in the prior 50 years . . . . The huge drop in 2001 contributed to massive 
tax revenue shortfalls in the states, which were especially pronounced when 2001 
tax returns were filed in April of 2002 [Boyd 2003]. 
Just as state differences in tax systems and residents generated different rates of revenue 
growth during the 1990s, these same differences produced different revenue losses 
among the states.  States in the Northeast—most of which have long relied on income 
                                                 
4 For an analysis arguing that state tax cuts in the 1990s were the major factors behind the drop in revenues, 
see Knight, Kusko, and Rubin (2003). 
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taxes—saw a one-year loss of nominal revenues between FY 2001 and FY 2002 of 15.3 
percent; the Far West states experienced a fall-off in tax revenues of 11.3 percent; while 
the Middle Atlantic and Rocky Mountain states saw revenue declines of 7.3 percent and 
7.1 percent, respectively (Boyd 2003).  By contrast, state revenues dropped by less than 3 
percent in the Great Lakes, the Southwest, the Southeast, and the Plains states—as many 
of these states relied more on consumption taxes and less on income taxes. 
To see the geographical variation produced by these factors in greater detail, Table 1 
shows the amount of total revenue collected by each state from 2001 to 2003 and 
provides the percent change in revenues from 2001 to 2003.  The major declines occurred 
between state fiscal years 2001 and 2002, though revenues continued to drop between 
2002 and 2003.  As expected, the largest and earliest declines occurred among states in 
the Northeast (Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island) and Far West 
(California, Alaska, Oregon), though nearly all states experienced some year-to-year 
revenue losses by 2003. 
In some ways, the largest revenue declines occurred among states that had the most 
private resources to manage them.  The states of the Northeast and Far West that saw the 
largest declines in tax revenues not only experienced greater than average revenue growth 
in the 1990s, they also tended to be wealthy states.  That is, they had higher fiscal 
capacities in the sense that their taxable resources were greater and more able to support 
efforts to increase revenues through future tax increases. 
We can see these differences in Figure 2, which compares the average revenue changes 
for states according to their fiscal capacities, as measured by the most widely available 
indicator, real per capita personal income (i.e., the mean per capita personal income for 
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such as West Virginia, Idaho, Mississippi, Louisiana, North Dakota, New Mexico, 
Arkansas, and Montana.  The states in the highest quartile include Connecticut, New 
York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Minnesota, and Massachusetts, and California.  (See 
Appendix A for a listing of states by fiscal capacity.)  Among the states in the lowest 
quartile, revenue changes between 2001 and 2003 were weak yet on average they showed 
slight gains.  By contrast, states in the highest quartile showed the largest declines in state 
revenues—around a 7 percent drop between fiscal years 2001 and 2003—while the two 
intermediate quartiles showed revenue declines between these extremes. 
The geographical pattern of severe revenue declines might suggest that the fiscal crisis hit 
states in a way that makes social programs and their beneficiaries less likely to be 
harmed.  The states that suffered the greatest revenue losses in the last couple of years 
were those that had the greatest private resources to draw on; they also tended to be the 
states that, in the past, had offered the most generous benefits and services to low-income 
families (Gais and Weaver 2002).  These comparatively wealthy states also experienced 
the biggest revenue increases in the 1990s, so it is possible that such states could cut back 
on programs or program 
expansions that were recent in 
origins without ripping the basic 
safety net in human service 
programs. 
However, the story is more 
complicated and less benign than 
that.  Although revenue declines in 
the poor states were not as steep as 
those in the wealthier states, many 
states with low-fiscal capacity also 
saw revenue shortfalls.  More 
important, these states experienced 
above average increases in social 
needs, as indicated by increases in 
poverty and enrollments in income 
support programs. 
Table 2 shows changes in three measures of demand or need for social programs.  
Average poverty rates increased the most among the poorest states between 2000 and 
2002 in the lowest quartile of states ranked according to per capita personal income, 
while states in the second poorest quartile also showed larger than average increases in 
poverty rates.  Food Stamp recipients per thousand population were not only highest 
among the states with lower fiscal capacity—as one would expect—they also increased at 
a faster rate between 2000 and 2002, so that the differences between richer and poorer 
states actually grew.  Food Stamp caseloads are useful (though not perfect) indicators of 
differences in state needs because their eligibility and benefit criteria are determined by 
national laws and because most poor families are eligible for some benefits, including 
many near-poor households up to 130 percent of the Federal Poverty Level. 
Figure 2.  Changes in Revenues, 2001-2003,
By State Fiscal Capacity









Mean 0.24% -1.59% -4.12% -6.60%
Median 1.48% -0.88% -1.05% -7.38%
Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest
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Table 1.  Total State Revenues, State Fiscal Years, 2000-2003 
 
 State Revenues, by Fiscal Year  
 2001 2002 2003 % Change 01-03 
Alaska  1,318,000 948,000 1,022,600 -28.89% 
Massachusetts  16,646,000 14,209,000 13,307,900 -25.08% 
California  76,436,000 62,957,000 64,730,000 -18.08% 
Wyoming  652,000 570,000 553,900 -17.71% 
Colorado  6,356,000 5,716,000 5,421,300 -17.24% 
Virginia  11,054,000 10,619,000 9,479,700 -16.61% 
Rhode Island  1,985,000 1,864,000 1,711,000 -16.01% 
Connecticut  9,238,000 7,610,000 7,983,200 -15.72% 
Oregon  5,063,000 4,035,000 4,397,000 -15.15% 
New York  44,158,000 42,475,000 39,681,100 -11.28% 
Delaware  1,708,000 1,779,000 1,556,200 -9.75% 
Oklahoma  4,804,000 4,561,000 4,378,700 -9.71% 
Georgia  13,688,000 12,978,000 12,640,300 -8.29% 
Idaho  2,457,000 2,206,000 2,274,800 -8.01% 
Vermont  905,000 817,000 845,500 -7.04% 
New Jersey 17,829,000 16,752,000 16,781,800 -6.24% 
Illinois  18,912,000 18,218,000 17,942,000 -5.41% 
Maryland  8,255,000 7,869,000 7,874,100 -4.84% 
New Mexico 3,050,000 3,017,000 2,917,917 -4.53% 
Arizona  6,192,000 6,252,000 5,943,000 -4.19% 
Utah  3,805,000 3,661,000 3,675,600 -3.52% 
Kansas  4,145,000 3,891,000 4,012,000 -3.32% 
Texas  29,868,000 28,858,000 28,917,100 -3.29% 
Michigan  20,527,000 20,211,000 20,067,800 -2.29% 
South Carolina  5,350,000 4,983,000 5,230,900 -2.28% 
Louisiana  5,936,000 6,024,000 5,805,533 -2.25% 
Nevada  2,360,000 2,395,000 2,311,100 -2.12% 
Missouri 7,295,000 7,231,000 7,231,000 -0.89% 
Iowa  4,776,000 4,662,000 4,735,000 -0.87% 
Maine  2,437,000 2,368,000 2,432,200 -0.20% 
Nebraska  2,457,000 2,366,000 2,456,400 -0.02% 
Washington  10,410,000 10,248,000 10,423,800 0.13% 
Hawaii  3,158,000 3,049,000 3,182,000 0.75% 
North Dakota  887,000 848,000 900,100 1.46% 
Arkansas  4,010,000 3,985,000 4,071,600 1.51% 
Wisconsin  9,117,000 9,051,000 9,263,400 1.58% 
Pennsylvania  20,091,000 19,574,000 20,497,100 1.98% 
North Carolina  12,870,000 12,825,000 13,163,100 2.23% 
Kentucky  6,775,000 6,721,000 6,976,000 2.88% 
Alabama  5,897,000 6,026,000 6,130,700 3.81% 
Ohio  15,650,000 15,474,000 16,318,000 4.09% 
Florida  18,921,000 19,073,000 19,743,100 4.16% 
Mississippi  4,912,000 4,886,000 5,129,500 4.24% 
South Dakota 639,000 637,000 671,250 4.80% 
West Virginia  2,790,000 2,895,000 2,975,900 6.25% 
Minnesota  11,423,000 11,880,000 12,284,000 7.01% 
Indiana  9,052,000 8,709,000 9,880,100 8.38% 
Tennessee  7,675,000 7,482,000 8,440,900 9.07% 
Montana  1,111,000 1,179,000 1,227,700 9.51% 
New Hampshire  1,128,000 1,197,000 1,248,600 9.66% 
U.S. Total/Average 486,178,000 457,841,000 460,843,500 -3.67% 
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Finally, TANF cash assistance caseloads have not fallen as much among poorer states as 
they have among comparatively wealthy states.  Among the poor states, caseloads tended 
to be static—with no 
general tendency up or 
down—while continued 
declines in cash assistance 
cases were not uncommon 
among wealthier states. 
These differences among 
the states should not be 
overdrawn.  All states are 
seeing major revenue 
slowdowns, and nearly all 
are experiencing increases 
in need or demand for 
social programs.  Still, 
there is an important 
divide and it is likely to 
affect the nonprofit sector.  
In the wealthier states, 
nonprofit service providers 
may be hurt by sharp, 
short-run revenue losses if 
states respond by cutting 
services.  In poorer states, 
growing demands for 
services—combined with 
little or no growth in revenues—may not only create greater competition for government 
resources but also confront nonprofits with many human needs not being met by 
government programs.  
 
The Fiscal Crisis and the Distribution of Nonprofits 
The picture for the nonprofit sector becomes even more fractured when we look at where 
it is.  How do the diverse effects of the economic downturn relate to the geographic 
distribution of the nonprofit organizations providing social services?  Two distinct stories 
emerge.  On the one hand, the human services part of the nonprofit sector is most 
prevalent among the wealthier states, which have seen the largest declines in tax 
revenues.  If large revenue declines generate proportionate cuts in social services, we 
would expect that a major part of the nonprofit sector would be affected.  On the other 
hand, the poorest states have the weakest nonprofit sectors—and thus would seem to be 
less able to deal with growing human needs. 
TABLE 2 
 
Changes in Need for Low-Income People 
 (Mean Need Levels for Each Quartile of Fiscal Capacity) 
 
    
State Fiscal Capacity--Quartiles, 
Per Capita Personal Income, 
1998-2000 
    Lowest 2nd 3rd Highest 
2002 15.5 11.3 9.5 10.0 
2000 14.0 10.4 9.4 9.5 
Poverty Rates 
(Percentages) 
Change 1.5 0.9 0.1 0.5 
      
2002 91 72 61 55 





Change 10 11 5 1
      
2003 14 17 17 21 





Change 0 1 -3 -4
      
Number of states = 13 13 13 12 
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To estimate the distribution of nonprofit organizations in the human services area, we 
examined per-capita employment in such organizations, based on data from the 1997 
U.S. Economic Census.5  Per capita employment in nonprofit organizations not only 
indicates the relative importance of such entities in state economies, it also compares the 
density of the sector’s most important resource, its people, across the states.6 
Figure 3 shows the distribution of employment (on a per capita basis) across states of 
different fiscal capacities for three types of nonprofit organizations:  social assistance 
organizations, hospitals, and nursing and residential care services.  These are three of the 
four divisions in the “Health and Social Assistance” category developed by the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS) and used by the U.S. Census Bureau.7  
The three groups include:  
1. Nursing and residential care services:  Industries in this sub-sector provide 
residential care combined with either nursing, supervisory, or other types of care 
as required by the residents. The care provided is a mix of health and social 
services with the health services being largely some level of nursing services.  
Most of the industry is for-profit, but a large part of the sub-sector (40 percent of 
employment in 1997) is in tax-exempt organizations.  
2. Hospitals:  This sub-sector provides medical, diagnostic, and treatment services 
that include physician, nursing, and other health services to inpatients and the 
specialized accommodation services required by inpatients. Hospitals may 
provide outpatient services as a secondary activity, but their primary activity is 
the provision of inpatient health services.  The industry is largely composed of 
nonprofits (90 percent of the employment in 1997). 
3. Social assistance organizations:  Industries in this grouping provide a wide 
variety of social assistance services directly to their clients.  They include child 
care providers, services for the elderly and persons with disabilities, vocational 
rehabilitation services, child and youth services, and community food, housing, 
and emergency services.  These services do not include residential or 
accommodation services, except on a short-stay basis.  Most of the industry is tax-
exempt (72 percent of the employment in 1997). 
Figure 3 shows that these nonprofit industries are larger (in per capita terms) in the 
wealthiest states and smaller in the poorest states.  The relationship is neither simple nor 
linear, nor is it identical for all three sub-sectors.  Nonetheless, the relationships are 
strong enough to suggest that the severe short-run revenue shortfalls among the wealthier 
                                                 
5 Data from the 2002 Economic Census will not be available before 2004. 
6 Other measures—such as the number of organizations or their total receipts—might also be used to 
understand the relative size of the nonprofit sector.  These indicators, however, are distributed in much the 
same way as employment, at least within basic types of industries, and would not affect the basic portrait of 
the sector. 
7 The fourth sub-sector is “ambulatory health care services,” which is not included here because it is 
overwhelmingly composed of for-profit organizations.  In 1997, only 3.3 percent of this sub-sector was 
composed of tax-exempt organizations, and only 15.2 percent of the people employed in this industry 
worked for nonprofits. 
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states are hitting these particular nonprofit sub-
sectors where they are most prevalent.  For that 
reason alone, the fiscal crisis could have a 
disproportionate impact on nonprofits 
providing human services.  In the poorest 
states, a different situation is developing.  In 
states where such nonprofits are weakest, the 
recession brought about the biggest increases 
in human needs.  Thus, the problems facing 
human service nonprofits differ across states, 
and these differences appear to be related, 
whether directly or indirectly, to state fiscal 
capacity. 
Reliance on Public Money 
The impact of the fiscal crisis has been 
compounded by a recent change in the relations 
between governments and nonprofit 
organizations delivering social welfare 
services:  These organizations have come to 
rely more on government funding.  Table 3 
used data from the Census of Business 
Organizations, conducted every five years, to 
show the growth in the proportion of total 
receipts that nonprofit “social assistance” 
organizations received from government 
sources.8  For these organizations, government 
receipts came from two sources:  (1) payments 
for services, and (2) contributions, gifts, and 
grants.  Health organizations were not 
included, since it was difficult to discern where 
payments for health care ultimately came from, 
though it is clear that Medicaid became a major 
support for a wide range of health care 
providers (Smith 2002; Gray and Schlesinger 
2002).   
                                                 
8 Comparisons across time are complicated by the change in the classification of organizations from the 
SIC to the NAICS between 1992 and 1997.  Here we compare SIC numbers 832, 833, 836, 839 in 1987 and 
1992 to NAICS 624 in 1997.  Unfortunately, 832 and 833 are comparable to parts of 624 but 826 is 
comparable to parts of 623, and there are further difficulties with 839 in the NAICS classification system.   
Another problem is that the 1987 survey report does not break out 832, 833, 836, and 839 but clumps them 
together, while the 1992 report does distinguish them.  For all these reasons, comparisons between 1997 
and earlier years are inexact. However, the general tendencies and conclusions are probably robust.  State-
level trends and differences seem reasonable, such as the considerable stability over all three years in some 
states (such as Arkansas), while other states showed constant rates of change (such as Pennsylvania). 
 
FIGURE 3 
AVERAGE EMPLOYMENT IN NONPROFIT  
SOCIAL SERVICE ORGANIZATIONS IN STATES,
BY STATE FISCAL CAPACITY, 1997 
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SOURCE:  U.S. Census Bureau (2000). 
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TABLE 3 
Percent Receipts from Government Sources for 
Nonprofit Social Services/Assistance Organizations 
State 1987 1992 1997 
Maine  66.8 70.8 81.5 
Mississippi  md 48.0 76.4 
New Mexico  50.3 md 74.0 
Wyoming  67.1 63.3 72.4 
Alaska  79.3 72.1 70.5 
Louisiana  62.4 51.3 69.6 
West Virginia  66.4 70.8 68.9 
Vermont  53.9 55.2 68.5 
Montana  61.3 60.2 67.1 
Arkansas  68.6 66.2 67.0 
Connecticut  48.4 57.0 66.8 
Florida  34.3 43.8 66.3 
Rhode Island  37.8 33.9 65.8 
New York  36.8 51.5 65.8 
Massachusetts  61.1 63.8 64.2 
Utah  32.8 md 64.1 
Arizona  42.4 53.7 63.5 
Pennsylvania  48.7 54.7 63.2 
California  43.3 51.0 63.2 
Kansas  46.6 47.2 62.1 
South Carolina  37.8 44.5 62.1 
New Jersey  44.1 56.8 61.2 
Idaho  64.0 53.0 61.1 
Delaware  31.0 46.8 60.9 
Maryland  38.8 49.2 60.7 
Illinois  42.4 50.3 60.2 
Michigan  45.9 52.6 59.9 
Minnesota  43.3 43.7 59.2 
Oklahoma  40.7 42.0 59.1 
Indiana  45.2 55.3 59.0 
Texas  29.7 37.5 58.8 
Alabama  44.0 53.4 57.4 
Missouri  43.3 42.8 57.4 
Iowa  57.0 58.1 56.8 
New Hampshire  60.6 62.1 56.5 
Washington  41.1 45.8 56.0 
Ohio  41.7 49.2 55.1 
Oregon  38.5 43.7 55.1 
Kentucky  41.8 48.2 55.0 
Wisconsin  43.3 43.1 54.5 
North Dakota  Md 54.0 54.5 
District of Columbia  30.8 md 54.3 
South Dakota  Md 54.5 54.1 
Hawaii  47.6 42.2 52.3 
Nevada  52.5 46.3 51.1 
Nebraska  20.6 23.2 50.9 
North Carolina  36.6 39.5 48.5 
Tennessee  39.2 37.7 47.6 
Colorado  35.3 44.3 43.7 
Virginia  35.3 27.0 40.0 
Georgia  25.5 33.0 38.9 






Table 3 shows that in 1987, government sources constituted less than half, 46 percent on 
average, of the total receipts of social assistance organizations.  This percentage grew to 
50 percent in 1992, and by 1997, social assistance organizations relied on government 
sources for at least 60 percent of their funding.  These figures probably underestimate the 
role of government, since in recent years governments have relied more on vouchers and 
even cash payments to support many services, such as child care and job training, and the 
payments may not always be attributed to public sources. 
 
Not all nonprofit social assistance organizations relied on government funding to the 
same extent.  Table 4 shows the percentage of total revenues drawn from government 
sources for the major subcategories of social assistance nonprofits in 1997. Organizations 
providing vocational rehabilitation, services for the elderly and disabled people, and other 
individual and family services depended most heavily on government funding—typically 
for about two-thirds of their revenues.  Child day care organizations, child and youth 
service agencies, and organizations providing community food, housing, and emergency 


























Vocational rehabilitation services $4,366,305 39.8 27.7 67.5 
Individual & family services $16,650,989 34.6 28.4 63.0 
 Services for the elderly & persons with disabilities $6,196,397 41.2 34.2 75.4 
 Other individual & family services $6,644,940 30.4 32.8 63.2 
 Child & youth services $3,809,652 33.2 16.2 49.4 
Child day care services $3,158,428 31.8 23.0 54.8 
Community food & housing/emergency, other relief services $2,828,114 18.0 28.5 46.5 
 Community housing services $1,828,646 25.3 36.6 61.9 
 Community food services $566,108 17.7 17.8 35.5 
 Emergency & other relief services $433,360 4.3 24.0 28.3 
All social assistance organizations (exempt) $27,003,836 32.7 27.6 60.3 
*Payments for counseling, community food shelter, vocational rehabilitation, child care, and related social assistance 
services provided to individuals and families—government payers only. 
**Contributions, gifts, and grants from government. 
 
Nonprofit social assistance organizations in poor states were more vulnerable to cuts in 
public spending:  They depended more on public sources of revenue, perhaps because 
these states offered fewer private resources to nonprofits.  Table 5 shows the average 
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percent of nonprofits’ budgets coming from government sources in 1997 by state fiscal 
capacity.  Social assistance organizations as a whole received an average of 64 percent of 
their revenues from government sources in the poorest states, higher than all the other 
state quartiles.  Child day care services and individual family services generated most of 
these differences.  Organizations involved in vocational rehabilitation and community 
relief showed no consistent pattern with respect to state fiscal capacity. 
Long-Run Trends in State Spending 
The state fiscal “crisis” thus shows two different faces.  The wealthier states saw 
precipitous drops in revenues, though the fall-offs came extraordinary increases in 
revenues due in part to capital gains in the middle and late 1990s.  These drops occurred 
in states where the human service nonprofits were strongest and most concentrated, 
suggesting that any cuts that states make in response to the fall-off in revenues could 
have a disproportionate impact on the national nonprofit sector—an impact that might be 
greater now than in past recessions because nonprofits have come to rely more on 




Average Percentage of Nonprofit Organization Revenues Obtained Directly from Government 
Social Assistance Organizations, 1997 Census Survey 
 
State Fiscal Capacity; Quartile of States 
Ranked by Per Capita Personal Income,  
1998-2000 









Vocational rehabilitation services 70% 75% 62% 72% 
Individual & family services 67% 60% 59% 61% 
Child day care services 61% 52% 50% 49% 
Community food & housing/emergency & relief services 51% 54% 42% 52% 
All social assistance organizations (exempt) 64% 59% 55% 60% 
 
But there is another, perhaps more complicated face to the economic crisis.  In states with 
low fiscal capacity, the short-run drop in revenues was not as great, but human needs 
have grown even faster than in the wealthier states.  Because the nonprofit sector is 
smaller in the poorer states on a per capita basis, private human service organizations are 
more likely to be strained to meet these needs—and whatever budget cuts in social 
services that states do impose may have a larger impact on the nonprofits in these states, 
since they tend to rely more on government funding.  As we will see in the remainder of 
this paper, the stresses on the nonprofit sector in states with low fiscal capacity appear to 
be even more acute when we consider both long-run and short-run developments in state 
human service expenditures.  
To examine expenditure trends over time, we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s survey of 
government expenditures, which includes annual data on spending by state and local 
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governments on several components of the very broad expenditure category of “Public 
Assistance.” Although there are six subcategories in Public Assistance, we simplified 
them by creating three types of expenditures: 
1. “Cash assistance” includes direct payments to people under federal assistance 
programs, such as TANF and SSI, as well as other cash payments made directly to 
needy persons, such as programs of general or home relief, emergency relief, 
energy assistance, housing expense relief, and other benefits. 
2. “Medical assistance” is simply the Census Bureau subcategory “Vendor Payments 
for Medical Care.”  It includes “payments under public welfare programs made 
directly to private vendors . . . for medical assistance and hospital or health care . . 
. .”  Although limited Medicaid spending may be found in other Census 
subcategories, this one may be reasonably treated as a proxy for Medicaid. 
3. “Other public welfare” collapses three Census subcategories, “Other public 
welfare,” “Vendor payments for other purposes,” and “Welfare institutions.”  
These expenditures include payments to private vendors for services and 
commodities (other than medical, hospital, and healthcare) on behalf of needy 
persons; provision, construction, and maintenance of public nursing homes, 
veterans’ homes, and homes for the elderly or aged; children services, such as day 
care, foster care, adoption, and nonresidential shelters; welfare-related community 
action programs; social services for the physically disabled; and administrative 
costs, including case management, for welfare and other assistance programs. 
Although nonprofits have substantially increased their roles in administering TANF 
assistance programs in recent years—as in certain cities and counties in Wisconsin, 
Arizona, and Texas—most of the “Public Assistance” dollars going to nonprofits are 
funneled through the latter two categories, with health-related organizations receiving the 
bulk of the “medical assistance” dollars and non-health organizations getting support for 
their services through the catchall “other public welfare” category. 
To determine whether and how funding for needy families has changed in recent decades, 
we examined these three categories of expenditure data between 1980 and 2000 (the most 
recent year available).  The data were adjusted for inflation (in 2000 dollars) and 
standardized by expressing the expenditures per total persons in the state (i.e., per capita) 
and per poor person (using a three-year average to reduce measurement error).  The data 
are displayed in five-year intervals in Table 6. 
The overall trends in the last two decades appear to be good for nonprofit organizations.  
After controlling for general inflation, the two spending categories most likely to involve 
private service providers—“medical assistance” and “other public welfare”—grew 
substantially over the years.  On a per capita basis, “medical assistance” more than tripled 
between 1980 and 2000, while “other public welfare” doubled.  By contrast, cash 
assistance declined in real terms, especially after 1995.  The result is a very different 
profile of public welfare spending in 2000 than in previous years.  In 1980, cash 
assistance was $83 out of a total of $334 per capita spending on public assistance—about 
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25 percent of the total.  Three-fourths of the public welfare budget was spent in ways 
likely to involve many private organizations, including nonprofits.  By 2000, only 7 
percent of the public welfare budget involved direct cash payments to individuals—the 
remainder tended to involve services and benefits, many of which were provided by 
nonprofits.  Since the total dollar amounts increased even after adjustments for inflation, 
there is little question that nonprofits and other private service organizations have gained 
access to a much larger part of the state human service budgets.  
The changes have been especially pronounced since the mid-1990s.  As the right-hand 
column of Table 6 demonstrates, cash assistance dropped in real per capita terms by $21 
between 1995 and 2000—a fall of 28 percent.  Medical assistance—again, on a real per 
capita basis—increased by 10 percent, while other public welfare spending grew by 17 
percent.  Since the number of poor people fell during this five-year period, these two 
increases in spending were even greater relative to the number of poor people in the 
states.  “Other public welfare” spending, for example, grew on a per-poor-person basis by 
45 percent between 1995 and 2000. 
TABLE 6 
Changes in Median State Expenditures on Social Programs, 1980-2000 
Spending in 2000 Dollars 
       
1.  Expenditures per capita (median)     
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1995-2000 
Cash assistance 83 63 68 75 54 -21 
Medical assistance 159 187 255 488 537 49 
Other public welfare 92 102 126 158 185 27 
       
2.  Expenditures per poor person (median)     
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1995-2000 
Cash assistance 632 527 585 650 521 -129 
Medical assistance 1,139 1,276 1,966 4,039 5,205 1,166 
Other public welfare 695 814 1,010 1,238 1,790 552 
 
This recent transformation in spending on social programs was examined in greater detail 
in a study by the Rockefeller Institute—in collaboration with the Brookings Institution 
and the U.S. General Accounting Office—by examining changes in federal and state 
spending in 17 states between 1995 and 1999 (with some data from 2000).  Using 
common data instrument, the three institutions compared social program spending 
through state budgets before and after the implementation of welfare reforms (Boyd and 
Billen 2003). 
The results were similar to the patterns in Table 6 though they provided greater detail 
regarding nonhealth expenditures.  Cash assistance declined in all states and more than 50 
percent in nominal terms in over half of the states (9 out of 17), while non-cash-
assistance spending increased substantially in all but one state.  The most widespread 
increases in spending occurred in child care.  Yet spending on “work support” 
functions—such as basic job services, employment-related training and education 
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programs, transportation, post-employment services, and state earned income tax 
credits—also increased widely and vigorously, with only two states showing declines. 
Child welfare services—including adoption assistance, foster care, independent living 
programs, and many others—also grew in nearly all states.  Spending growth was less 
consistent though generally weaker in the two remaining non-cash-assistance categories:   
“other welfare-related services,” including juvenile justice, family formation/pregnancy 
prevention, and substance abuse and treatment programs; and “other basic needs,” 
usually in-kind benefits such as housing and food assistance programs in the state budget 
(e.g., not Food Stamps). 
In general, then, spending increased between 1980 and 2000, and especially since 1995, 
in ways likely to benefit nonprofit service organizations.  Less money is spent through 
state budgets on cash assistance, while more dollars are spent on medical assistance and a 
wide variety of services that tend to support work activities, provide in-kind benefits, and 
remedy certain severe barriers to work and independence, such as substance abuse. 
State Fiscal Capacity and Differences in Spending 
 
There are, however, important state differences in these trends, and those differences are 
correlated with state fiscal capacities.  Figures 4A, 4B, and 4C show median state 
expenditures per poor person on the three basic social program functions between 1980 
and 2000 and compare these trends for states of different fiscal capacities.  Fiscal 
capacity is again measured in terms of per capita personal income in each state.  Because 
we are interested in changes over a longer period of time, fiscal capacity was estimated 
by averaging per capita personal income over the 20-year period.9 
States of all fiscal capacity levels—whether in the poorest ones in the lowest quartile or 
the wealthiest states in the highest quartile—showed the same general trends toward 
lower spending on cash assistance, rapid increases in spending on medical assistance, and 
moderate growth in spending on “other public welfare.”  Yet there were important 
differences.   Declines in cash assistance spending were strong among the states with 
higher fiscal capacity between 1995 and 2000 (Figure 4A).  These were states that 
typically offered more generous cash grants, and as many families left the rolls either 
voluntarily or no, the states saw large declines in spending on cash assistance.  States 
with low fiscal capacity, on the other hand, generally offered smaller cash grants, less 
generous earnings disregards, and stricter asset limits.  As a result, people in these states 
tended to use cash assistance for short periods of time, and spending on cash assistance 
was never very high.  That meant, however, that these states got little fiscal dividend  
                                                 
9 Although state fiscal capacity certainly varies over such a long period, there is surprisingly little 
movement from one quartile to another over this period.  In later sections when we analyze post-2000 
changes in spending, we use a different time period for estimating states’ fiscal capacities, namely, the 
average per capita personal income for 1998 through 2000.  This more recent division of states is very 
closely correlated with the division created from the 20-year averaging, with no states showing more than a 
one quartile difference between the two distributions.  See Appendix A for a cross-tabulation between these 
two measures.  
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Figure 4A.  Average State Spending Per Poor Person on Cash 
















Figure 4B.  Average State Spending Per Poor Person on Medical 
















Figure 4C.  Average State Spending Per Poor Person Other Other 
















when TANF caseloads declined in the late 1990s (also see Boyd and Billen 2003).  The 
1990s thus brought large financial savings to wealthy states, savings they could apply to 
noncash forms of assistance, an opportunity poor states did not have. 
By contrast, spending on medical assistance grew in all states during the 1990s, quickly 
in the early 1990s and steadily in the latter half of the decade (Figure 4B).  The growth 
was stronger among the poorer states.  One consequence was that by 2000, the 
differences in spending by rich and poor states on medical assistance per poor person had 
diminished.  In 2000, states in the highest quartile spent 1.8 times as much ($7,173 per 
poor person) as those in the lowest quartile ($3,999 per poor person).  That ratio was 
down from the 2.6 in 1995—and was the lowest ratio in the two decades.   These changes 
meant that an increasing share of human service spending was being absorbed by medical 
assistance among poor states.  By 2000, medical assistance constituted 75 percent of the 
total public welfare budget in the poorest states, compared to 65 percent in the richest 
quartile. 











suggest that poor 
states might have 
fewer resources 
to spend on 
“other public welfare” functions, including many of the services traditionally provided by 
nonprofit social assistance organizations outside the health field.  In the resource-rich 
late-1990s, this problem had not yet appeared.  In constant dollars, as Figure 4C shows, 
spending grew for this function among the poor states in the 1990s.  Yet the rate of 
growth was much slower in these states.  As a result, a growing divide between poor and 
rich states emerged by the late 1990s in their spending on “other public welfare” 
functions.  As a percentage of total public welfare spending, these “other public welfare” 
expenditures declined substantially in the poorest states—from 30 percent of the total in 
1980 to only 19 percent in 2000 (see Figure 4D).  By contrast, in the wealthiest quartile, 
“other public welfare” spending remained nearly constant throughout this period at about 
25 percent of the total public welfare budget.10 
                                                 
10 Although we do not have direct evidence about how much nonprofit social assistance organizations rely 
these “other public welfare” expenditures, we have some indirect evidence.  We regressed the per capita 
number of employees in social assistance organizations in 2001 (using the Bureau of Labor Statistics ES-
202 data, which includes for-profit as well as nonprofit organizations) on a number of state-level variables, 
Figure 4D.  Percentage of Public Welfare Spending on "Other 















The spending trends at the end of the decade thus produced an asymmetry among the 
states.  The poorest states were being pressed by a rapidly growing medical assistance 
budget.  Their cash assistance expenditures had virtually no more room to go down.  The 
consequence was that their non-health, non-cash public welfare spending—the spending 
most likely to go to nonprofit providers outside the health area—was becoming a smaller 
part of the public welfare pie. 
Post-2000 Changes in State Spending 
To understand how and where nonprofits are being affected by the current fiscal crisis, 
we need to know how different states are changing their social program spending—and 
especially how states of different fiscal capacities are responding to the challenges posed 
by the economic downturn.   
TANF and Child Care 
TANF 
One funding stream where states have great flexibility in supporting social programs is 
the federal block Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), enacted in 1996 as 
part of the nation’s welfare reforms.  States have the authority to use the block grant for 
many purposes, including the promotion of work, marriage, two-parent families, reducing 
out-of-wedlock births, and helping needy children live with their parents.  They have 
used their flexibility in spending TANF and Maintenance of Effort (MOE) funds to 
generate great diversity and change among state public welfare policies and budgets (see 
Gais, Nathan, Lurie and Kaplan, 2001). 
We should note, however, that TANF is more likely to reinforce than counteract 
differences in state fiscal capacity.  TANF grants were based on federal spending levels 
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), which themselves were 
                                                                                                                                                 
including per capita spending on “cash assistance,” “medical assistance,” and “other public welfare” in 
2000.  The independent variables also included state per capita personal income (as a private source of 
financial support) and the state’s poverty rate in 2001 (as an indicator of need).  The estimated regression 
equation showed that state spending on “cash assistance” and their poverty rates had no impact on per 
capita employment in social assistance organizations.  Per capita personal income had a marginally 
significant but not a very strong effect.  By contrast, “other public welfare” and “medical assistance” 
spending showed significant relationships to employment in social assistance organizations.  The estimated 
effects of spending and nonprofit employment was about 2.4 times greater for “other public welfare” 
expenditures than for “medical assistance.”  See estimated equation below: 
 
Dependent variable:  Employment in social 





Intercept -1.32 x 10-3  
Federal poverty rate (1998-00 avg) 7.17 x 10-3 0.78 
Per capita personal income (1998-00 avg) 1.23 x 10-7 1.89 
Cash assistance spending per capita, 2000 3.57 x 10-6 0.77 
Medical assistance spending per capita, 2000 3.71 x 10-6 2.36 
Other public welfare spending, per capita, 2000 8.92 x 10-6 2.85 
N = 51          R2 = 0.62 
 
 19
strongly correlated with state fiscal capacity (Plotnick and Winters 1985).  The size of the 
grants varied greatly across states.  As Kent Weaver noted: 
[T]here are immense disparities across states in the block grants received per low-
income child.  In the 10 states receiving in the least generous federal grant [nearly 
all of which are states with low fiscal capacity], the TANF block grant providers 
only $429 per low-income child, while in the 10 states receiving the most federal 
dollars [nearly all of which are states with high fiscal capacity], TANF provides 
around five times as much [2002]. 
The TANF block grant essentially froze a major part of the resource base for nonhealth 
social service spending and limited the ability of states with low fiscal capacity to 
respond to large and unequal increases in social needs.  We might thus expect different 
dynamics between rich and poor states as they adapt their TANF grants to the fiscal and 
economic crises.  
We began to see some changes not long ago as we received reports on local TANF 
implementation from the Rockefeller Institute’s last round of TANF field research in late 
2001 and 2002 (for a brief overview of some of our findings, see Fossett, Gais, and 
Thompson 2003).  Only a few states had been hit by the economic downturn early 
enough to strongly affect FY 2002 budget decisions, but even at this early stage we 
discerned some of the criteria states and localities were using to distinguish between 
which programs would remain and which would be eliminated.  Arizona—a states with 
low fiscal capacity—was one of the first states to be hit hard by the recession, and its 
budget crisis was exacerbated by the passage of a citizen initiative (Proposition 204) that 
greatly expanded Medicaid spending by increasing the program’s eligibility limit from 
about 30 percent of the federal poverty level to 100 percent of the federal poverty level. 
This voter initiative plus an early economic downturn pushed up TANF cash assistance 
rolls and led Arizona to make several cuts.  Most of the cuts were in recently enacted 
service programs in which nonprofits participated, including a transportation program, a 
program to help “young fathers” become self-sufficient and involved with their children, 
a parenting skills program, a character education program for youths (people under 19), 
and post-employment training for TANF families.  Arizona also reduced its 
administrative staff and even eliminated job services (except by phone contacts) for one 
group of TANF recipients, namely, single-parent families in rural districts.  These 
families were singled out as expensive to serve and more likely to meet their federal 
performance criteria than were the two-parent families. 
Another poor state, West Virginia, reduced its cash assistance grants by cutting its earned 
income disregard from 60 percent to 40 percent in early 2002.  The state also reduced the 
size of its diversionary cash payments by 25 percent and lowered its definition of 
economically needy from 185 to 150 percent of the federal poverty level.  The state also 
gave formal notification to many community service organizations and others that $27 
million in contracts and grants would not be renewed for the 2003 state fiscal year, 
though some of these were eventually reinstated. 
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Wealthier states also made changes.  Michigan slashed its administrative staff, largely 
through early retirements.  It eliminated “fatherhood” programs and after-school 
programs for youths.  Washington State cut after-school programs and programs for 
parenting and family management skills; it increased co-payments on child care benefits; 
and it also imposed reductions in administrative staff. 
To get a more precise and up-to-date understanding of TANF responses to the economic 
downturn, the Rockefeller Institute requested the quarterly TANF financial report, ACF-
196, from a selection of states that were hit hard by the economic downturn, ensuring 
diversity in state fiscal capacity as well as whether the states were mostly affected by 
increases in need (measured by Food Stamp caseloads) or declines in state tax revenues.  
The list of 19 states from which we obtained reports may be found below.11  To see how 
spending patterns changed before and after the recession, we obtained second quarter 
reports for federal Fiscal Years 2000 and 2003 from the U.S. Administration for Children 
and Families.  These second quarter reports cover state spending for the first six months 
of each federal fiscal year, from October 1 through March 31.  Since the ACF-196 Form 
breaks down expenditures in several categories of assistance, nonassistance, and services, 
it permits us to see whether and how states are reshaping their spending priorities in 
response to new budgetary pressures.  Thus far, we have obtained paired reports for 10 
low-capacity and 9 high-capacity states (based on median per capita state income 
averaged over 1998-2000).12 
One question is whether the recession affected who was being served by the TANF 
program.  In the 1990s, there was a substantial shift away from “assistance” (mostly cash 
but also child care for 
nonworking parents and some 
other services that did not 
support work) and toward 
“nonassistance” (including just 
about any other benefit or 
service, though mostly child care, 
transportation, and job services 
for working families or families 
seeking work).  The question is 
important for nonprofits not only 
because it is roughly related to 
the cash vs. services dichotomy 
but also because it affects 
                                                 
11 Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Illinois, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, West 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  These states were selected because they had larger than average revenue declines 
between 2000 and 2003 or had larger than average increases in Food Stamp caseloads.  We also added 
some low fiscal capacity states that were near-average on these change indicators in order to ensure balance 
with respect to low and high fiscal capacity. 
 
12 We have requested reports from all states under a Freedom of Information request, but we do not expect 
to receive the remaining reports until late November at the earliest. 
Figure 5.  Average Percent TANF Spending on 









Low FC 46.1 45.6
High FC 51.8 58.3
2000 2003
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whether certain groups (such as working families, who tend to benefit from 
nonassistance) will be needing services to compensate for public cuts. 
As Figure 5 shows, states with low fiscal capacity reduced the proportion of their 
expenditures going to nonassistance between 2000 and 2003.  By contrast, states with 
high fiscal capacity states continued to increase the proportion of expenditures going to 
nonassistance.  The net effect was a growing difference between the clienteles served by 
high-capacity and low-capacity states—and a reversal of the typical pattern in the 1990s, 
when poor states spent a larger share of their TANF money on nonassistance.13 
This shifting balance between nonassistance and assistance is only one of the many 
changes states are making in their human service budgets.  To understand the changes 
relevant to nonprofit sector in greater detail, Table 7 divides TANF spending into four 
main categories: 
1. Basic assistance—mostly cash assistance delivered, though not always, through 
public agencies; 
2. Services, which are often provided through nonprofits, including work-related 
services, child care, supportive services (mostly transportation), family structure 
programs (e.g., promoting marriage and preventing out of wedlock births), and 
“other” services (including transfers to the eclectic Social Services Block Grant). 
3. Other direct payments to individuals, such as state refundable earned income tax 
credits and individual development accounts; and  
4. Administrative costs and information systems, which typically go to public 
agencies rather than nonprofit providers.    
These categories were selected in part because they suggest different impacts on 
nonprofits.  We should note, however, that their assumed mapping onto nonprofits at best 
reflects general tendencies.  In Milwaukee, for example, nonprofits dominate the delivery 
of Wisconsin’s W-2 program, the closest thing the state has to a “cash assistance” 
program (Kaplan 2000).  Some for-profit organizations provide a wide variety of services 
in some states, especially in the work-related areas of job placement and preparation.  
And, of course, many child care providers are for-profits.  Also, there are substantial 
shifts in states from one type of provider to another—and some “taking back” of 
functions once contracted out to nonprofits—so a single funding stream will have a 
shifting relationship to the nonprofit sector and its components.  For example, our field 
research team in Missouri learned that one of the first responses by the state to budget 
scarcities in FY 2002 was to eliminate contracted case management services (admittedly, 
not a large program) and bring all such services in-house.  Still, these categories roughly 
                                                 
13  One reason why low fiscal capacity states put less of their TANF money into cash assistance in the 
1990s was because they typically offered smaller cash grants and less generous earnings disregards (see 
Gais and Weaver 2002).  Thus, during a period when labor participation rates were expanding, even part-
time workers lost eligibility for basic assistance and were more likely to be part of the state’s 
“nonassistance” population. 
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connect major nonprofit sources to the reporting categories available under the federal 
TANF reporting system. 
The table cells show per capita spending (for two quarters only, since we received the 
mid-year reports) for each of the functions, divided by year and state fiscal capacity.14  
The main categories are in bold italics.  Below the large services category, there are 
several subcategories.  These subcategories sum to the main category above them.  We 
also show the size of the TANF grant for the two quarters covered in 2000 and 2003 and 
the “unobligated balance.” 
TABLE 7 
TANF Spending on Selected Functions, 2000-2003 
 
Table entries are per capita dollars spent on function for the first two quarters (six months) 
Of the federal fiscal years 2000 and 2003 
 
Low Fiscal Capacity 
States 
High Fiscal Capacity 
States 
Functions 2000 2003 2000 2003 
Basic assistance only 8.3 10.3 14.4 14.5 
Services 11.0 12.4 21.3 23.0 
Child care (child care for families on assistance, 
nonassistance, as well as transfers to CCDF) 3.6 5.4 12.7 12.0 
Work-related activities (work subsidies, education and 
training, job services, etc.) 2.2 2.4 3.2 2.5 
Support services (transportation, etc.) 1.1 1.1 .5 .8 
Family structure (programs promoting marriage and 2 
parent families; preventing out of wedlock pregnancies) 0.8 0.1 0.2 1.1 
Other services (includes transfers to the Social Services 
Block Grant) 3.3 3.4 4.7 6.6 
Other direct benefits to individuals (refundable earned 
income tax credits, individual development accounts, 
non-recurrent SR benefits) 1.5 1.0 2.2 3.7 
Administrative expenditures/systems 2.7 2.3 3.4 3.4 
     
Unobligated funds 7.2 4.5 10.3 4.9 
     
Total TANF grant (2 quarters) 20.2 22.1 32.6 32.6 
Number of states = 10 10 9 9 
 
As expected, poorer states spent much less under TANF on a per capita basis than 
wealthier states for all types of spending.  Differences between states with high fiscal 
capacity and ones with low fiscal capacity were especially great for services.  In 2003, 
states with low fiscal capacity spent $12.4 dollars per capita per six months on services, 
while states with high fiscal capacity spent $23.0 dollars per capita during the first two 
quarters of the fiscal year—85 percent more than poor states.  The differences in 
spending on child care spending were especially great.  States with high fiscal capacity 
spent 122 percent more than states with low capacity in 2003.  Differences were not as 
                                                 
14 We use per capita spending rather than “per poor person” to standardize data since data on the number of 
poor people is not available in the most recent years, while population data are. 
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substantial for basic assistance.  In 2003, states with high fiscal capacity spent $14.5 
dollars per capita per half year on basic assistance, 41 percent more than the $10.3 spent 
by states with low fiscal capacity.  Thus, wealthier states were putting more of their 
TANF grants and MOE expenditures into service programs that frequently involve 
nonprofits. 
States also differed in the changes they made between 2000 and 2003.  Poor states 
substantially increased their spending on basic assistance—that category grew on a per 
capita basis by nearly 20 percent between 2000 and 2003.  Wealthier states showed no 
significant per capita increase—perhaps reflecting the different caseload dynamics we 
noted in Table 2. 
Somewhat surprisingly, poor states also increased their spending on child care, while 
states with higher fiscal capacity cut theirs (mostly by transferring less money into 
CCDF).  Poor states also kept up their spending on other services with the exception of 
the small amounts previously spent on family structure services—funding for these 
programs in poor states was nearly eliminated by 2003.  Wealthy states increased 
spending on programs related to marriage and pregnancy prevention; direct benefits to 
individuals (such as diversion payments or refundable earned income tax credits); and 
especially “other” functions, such as transfers to SSBG. 
How were poor states able to increase spending on both basic assistance and services?  
They cut administrative expenses, spending on information systems, and other direct 
benefits to individuals (e.g., diversion payments).  They also reduced their “unobligated 
funds” under TANF by nearly 40 percent.  States with low fiscal capacity also benefited 
from an increase in their TANF grants 
between 2000 and 2003, largely a result of 
supplemental funding that kicked in during 
the economic downturn.  We can therefore 
see the expected pressures on the poor states 
in these data; only child care providers got a 
little a more money.  But it is also clear that 
the pressures through early 2003 had been 
alleviated by TANF surpluses and the extra 
federal assistance during the recession. 
These mitigating factors, however, are 
quickly dwindling, making it unlikely that 
the increased spending on services between 
2000 and 2003 can be sustained.  Although 
only one of the 19 states in our sample had 
zeroed out its “unobligated balance” under 
TANF in 2000, five states had reached that 
point in 2003.  The U.S. General Accounting 
Office also found that, starting in 2001, states had begun to draw heavily on their TANF 
reserves, and that these reserves have declined quickly through FY 2003 (U.S. General 
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Figure 6.  Average state spending (from  
federal sources only) on the Child Care 
Development Fund, 1998-2002; By State 
Fiscal Capacity 
 
SOURCE:  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU.  FEDERAL 
AID TO STATES (1999, 2001, 2003). 
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We should also note that though there is some prospect that child care funding may be 
increased when TANF is reauthorized, the current bills under consideration by the U.S. 
Congress do not increase TANF grants to the states, making it more difficult for states 
with low fiscal capacity to increase their spending on TANF services if their basic 
assistance spending continues to rise.  
Child care 
Child care spending in the TANF budget represented only some of the funds available for 
that function.  The Child Care and Development Fund block grant has grown 
substantially since the mid-1990s.  However, even over the four-year period between 
1998 and 2002, there was an important shift in the distribution of these funds, one that 
reinforced the correlation in TANF between spending on child care and state fiscal 
capacity.  Figure 6 presents part of the picture by showing average state spending from 
federal sources (which constitutes the great bulk of spending under CCDF) in 1998, 
2000, and 2002—broken down by state quartiles with respect to per capita personal 
income. 
The increase in spending under CCDF was substantial for all states, but the greatest 
increase occurred among the wealthiest.  In 1998, CCDF federal spending had a mild 
inverse relationship to state fiscal capacity—which one would expect, given the greater 
proportion of poor and near-poor families in such states.  By 2002, however, the relation 
had become mildly positive, with higher levels of federal spending on child care among 
the wealthiest states.  Thus, even though direct child care spending under TANF declined 
slightly between 2000 and 2003 (Table 9) among the wealthier states, and such spending 
increased among the poorer states, these changes are counterbalanced by other shifts in 
child care spending, with the effect of creating greater differences between poor and rich 
states in spending on nonprofit child care organizations. 
General patterns and criteria 
Although TANF and child care budget figures are still fairly stable through mid-2003, 
that does not mean that there are not major shifts in who is getting services, what kinds of 
services they are getting, and which organizations are delivering them.  That sort of 
updated detail requires field research, however.  The Rockefeller Institute is now 
conducting such research in six states as part of a study with the Lewin Group on factors 
affecting state spending on social programs—under contract with the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services.  However, the results of that study will not be available until 
the late winter of 2004.  In the meantime, we summarize a number of recent studies by 
other organizations regarding detailed changes in TANF programs and related child care 
subsidies as well as our findings from the 2001-02 field research.15 
Several patterns stand out as relevant to nonprofit organizations: 
                                                 
15  We only discuss enacted changes.  Gubernatorial proposals or budget bills are often changed before they 
reach their final form and often misleading. 
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1. Social welfare programs that do not serve core constituencies—constituencies 
whose short-run behavior is key to program performance or other critical program 
goals—are more likely to be cut.  After-school programs and other programs 
serving youths are not faring well.  In Colorado, for example, the first programs to 
be cut in 2002 were youth diversion programs and some other TANF programs 
directly serving children.16  Fatherhood programs and other efforts to serve 
noncustodial parents have also been reduced or eliminated.  Note, for example, 
the cuts in mentioned above in Arizona, Michigan, and Washington State.  
Mississippi also eliminated its fatherhood programs, which constituted a large 
part of its charitable choice initiative (Bartkowski 2003).  The Center for Budget 
and Policy Priorities (CBPP) found similar cuts, such as a Wisconsin work-based 
learning program for youths (Parrott and Wu 2003). 
2. Services that do not seem to be necessary conditions for the achievement of key 
goals are also vulnerable.  For example, many job and training services have been 
cut or eliminated.  CBPP also found cuts in job and educational services, 
including literacy programs (Parrott and Wu 2003).  Such services may be viewed 
as effective but are not always viewed as necessary conditions for getting people 
into jobs, since many people are seen as willing and able to get jobs on their own 
(particularly now, as many new TANF entrants come from the workforce). 
3. On the other hand, services that are viewed as logically required for basic 
program objectives—such as transportation and child care—are less vulnerable to 
large cuts.  It is true that CBPP found cuts in transportation programs in a number 
of states (in our sample, they would include Massachusetts, Arizona, and 
Wisconsin), and it found many cuts in child care.  However, at least through FY 
2003, many of the transportation programs have survived (perhaps if for no other 
reason than because they are too small to save much money), and the child care 
cuts have typically not hit the core TANF constituency, i.e., people on the cash 
assistance rolls or those who have recently left. 
4. Where cuts have been made in child care, they have been imposed on families 
outside the core TANF constituency (i.e., families on TANF or those who have 
recently left welfare).  A recent study by the U.S. General Accounting Office 
(2003a), for example, found that, based on a survey completed in March and April 
of 2003, about one-third of the states (15) reported no changes since January 2001 
in their child care subsidy programs; 23 states reported reductions; 9 states 
indicated expansions; and 3 states showed a mix of cuts and expansions.  Many of 
the cuts involved reductions in eligibility for working families who were neither 
on TANF nor recently on welfare, and who are viewed as less the state’s basic 
performance criteria (e.g., work participation rates or caseload reductions).  Other 
reductions in access included increases in co-payments.  These changes may 
reduce child care providers’ income somewhat, but they do not seem likely to 
threaten the nonprofit child care industry in a major way.  There are, however, 
exceptions.  Texas (on the basis of per capita income, a state with moderately low 
                                                 
16  Communication with Malcolm Goggin, RIG field research associate in Colorado. 
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fiscal capacity) made major cuts in child care in FY 2003, including an $80 
million reduction in transfers to CCDF. 
5. Indeed, some of the direct payments to child care providers have been the least 
likely elements of the child care programs to be cut.  In the GAO study, 28 out of 
32 states increased reimbursement rates to child care providers.  Only four states 
cut those rates.  States also reported increases in their child care quality 
improvement programs in 22 states, while only 10 states reported decreases. 
6. The budget data presented above as well as our own field research in a number of 
program areas suggest that this budget crisis will differ from earlier ones in the 
size of the cuts in administrative staff and system improvements.  Nonprofits may 
have a particularly important role to play in helping low-income families navigate 
through increasingly harried and overwhelmed eligibility workers and case 
managers. 
7. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that one of the major changes in TANF 
spending will be its use as a funding source for programs whose own funding 
sources are cut or endangered.  The increased spending on “other” services is just 
one bit of evidence.  Another GAO study found that states were using TANF to 
replace some of the cuts in federal funds in the Social Services Block Grant 
(SSBG) (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2003b).  Texas has greatly increased 
the TANF and MOE dollars allocated to a wide range of state agencies.  The 
budget of the state’s Department of Protective and Regulatory Services increased 
its reliance on TANF/MOE funds from 10 percent to 29 percent between 1997 
and 2001.  Competition for TANF/MOE dollars may be encompassing a much 
wider range of agencies and programs. 
Of course, FY 2004 and FY 2005 may show different pictures, probably worse.  For the 
moment, however, the nonprofits that are most likely be hurt thus far are those serving 
adolescents and at-risk youths; providing after-school programs; offering education, 
training, and job services to low-income people; helping low-income fathers or other 
noncustodial parents; and (though this will vary greatly across states) providing child care 
to low-income families.  And all of these tendencies will probably be much more severe 
in low fiscal capacity states. 
Medicaid 
Medicaid is not only the largest and fastest-growing part of state public welfare budgets, 
it is, on average, the second largest component of state spending after education. 
Medicaid pays for a wide range of services, including physician services, hospital care 
and long-term care. Nonprofits that are providers—whether they are hospitals, skilled 
nursing facilities, or mental health facilities—have long relied on Medicaid funding.  
Since Medicaid costs have been growing in recent years from prescription drugs, hospital 
costs, increased enrollment, and other factors, the program has been the focus of many 
state budget debates. 
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As noted above, states with low fiscal capacity saw rapid growth through 2000 in the 
percentage of state spending occupied by Medicaid.  This trend emerged out of (1) strong 
growth in Medicaid spending in all states, including the poor ones, even on a per capita 
basis and controlling for inflation; and (2) lower growth rates in other forms of social 
program spending, especially cash assistance, especially among poor states.  The last 
section noted that in recent years, the economic downturn has pushed cash assistance 
spending back up a bit in states with low fiscal capacity.  In this section, we will note that 
Medicaid spending is continuing to grow even in recent years of budgetary scarcity.  
Assuming that public welfare spending as a whole will be under some pressure from 
education spending, corrections, roads and highways, and other basic functions not to 
expand its total share of the state budget, the combination of continued growth in 
TABLE 8 
Changes in Medicaid Spending:  State, Federal and Total, 2000 – 2003 
(Based on Federal Fiscal Years) 
          
  State/Local Federal Total 














High fiscal capacity states 
Connecticut 475 541 14% 480 566 18% 955 1,107 16% 
New Jersey 372 482 30% 375 489 30% 746 971 30% 
Massachusetts 517 647 25% 523 660 26% 1,040 1,307 26% 
New York 816 1,035 27% 824 1,048 27% 1,640 2,083 27% 
Colorado 232 295 27% 236 301 27% 468 596 27% 
Illinois 327 290 -12% 336 294 -12% 663 584 -12% 
Minnesota 346 492 42% 373 500 34% 719 992 38% 
California 318 426 34% 349 443 27% 667 868 30% 
Michigan 336 390 16% 413 477 16% 749 867 16% 
Wisconsin 264 414 57% 375 583 55% 639 997 56% 
Oregon 268 357 33% 404 542 34% 673 899 34% 
 
Lower fiscal capacity states 
Kansas 222 282 27% 332 428 29% 554 710 28% 
Missouri 290 378 31% 440 592 35% 729 970 33% 
North Carolina 266 321 21% 439 535 22% 705 856 21% 
Maine 333 444 34% 641 860 34% 973 1,304 34% 
Arizona 146 120 -18% 313 257 -18% 459 377 -18% 
South Carolina 209 581 178% 479 311 -35% 688 893 30% 
Louisiana 239 319 34% 555 781 41% 793 1,100 39% 
New Mexico 191 268 40% 521 804 54% 712 1,072 51% 
West Virginia 208 263 27% 589 755 28% 797 1,018 28% 
Mississippi 170 242 42% 548 782 43% 718 1,025 43% 
*The first two quarters of FFY 2003 are real expenditures.  To get the full fiscal year, we doubled the first two 
quarters, except for Maine and Wisconsin, which is the first quarter multiplied by four because the second quarter 
expenditures were not available. 
 
SOURCE:  The Medicaid expenditure data came from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services.  Data for 2000 




Medicaid and a reversal or halt in the decline in cash assistance spending will put some 
pressure on nonhealth human services—to the probable detriment of nonprofit providers 
that cannot tap into Medicaid. 
As Table 8 indicates, the growth we saw in the Medicaid “proxy” in the spending data 
seems to have continued through early 2003, for rich and poor states alike.  The table 
shows Medicaid spending per capita for 2000 and 2003—the latter is estimated based on 
the first two quarters of spending (the most recent reports available).  Growth in both 
state and local spending as well as federal funding continued in nearly all states, typically 
at high rates.  Because the states are ranked in the table according to their fiscal 
capacity—from the wealthiest, Connecticut, to the poorest, Mississippi—it is possible to 
see how fiscal 
capacity relates to 
state and local 
spending on this 
program.  There is, 




more per capita of 
their own revenues 
on Medicaid.  But it 
is also clear that poor states have been increasing their own spending on Medicaid more 
quickly than wealthier states in recent years. 
Table 9 shows these patterns more directly.  Summarizing the changes represented in 
Table 8, Table 9 shows that growth in state and local spending on Medicaid was 
especially strong among states with low fiscal capacity, though growth was substantial 
nearly everywhere.  Thus, while we are seeing growing differences among states with 
respect to fiscal capacity outside the health area, states’ spending for Medicaid is 
converging.  Indeed, as suggested already, this rapid growth in health spending across all 
states may have contributed to the growing divergence among states outside the health 
area.  
Still, many states have tried to rein in Medicaid spending in recent years, and these 
efforts to control Medicaid costs can have varying impacts on the nonprofit sector.  For 
instance, cuts in provider payments impact nonprofits because many of these providers 
rely upon Medicaid payments. Charging Medicaid recipients’ co-payments may also have 
a peripheral effect on nonprofits because there could be a subsequent decline in the 
number of people served, due to the deterrent effect of co-pays on service utilization. 
Similarly, cuts in eligibility could also impact nonprofit organizations because with a 
smaller eligible population, nonprofit organizations could experience a decline in the 
amount of fees collected for services. Medicaid benefit reductions could also impact 
nonprofits providing the particular benefit or service that was cut. Other actions, such as 
 
TABLE 9. 
Average State/Local and Federal  Spending on Medicaid Per Capita 






 2000 2003 2000 2003 
State/local spending on Medicaid, per capita 231 325 400 501 
     Percent change, 2000-2003 40.7% 25.3% 
Total spending on Medicaid, per capita 709 929 829 1,037 
     Percent change, 2000-2003 31.0% 25.1% 
Number of states = 11 11 10 10 
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pharmacy cost controls, or programs to decrease fraud and abuse may have less of an 
impact on nonprofit organizations. 
Of course, it is possible that states can rein in Medicaid spending, and nearly all states are 
trying to do that in some ways.  These Medicaid “cost control” measures, such as holding 
provider rates constant, implementing cost and utilization controls for prescription drugs, 
eliminating certain benefits from coverage, charging co-pays or cracking down on fraud 
and abuse, may also have major impacts on nonprofit providers.  What is interesting, 
however, is that although most media reports about Medicaid make it appear as though 
the program is being significantly cut in the current fiscal crisis, a closer examination of 
state actions reveals that Medicaid has in fact fared well in state budgets through FY 
2003 and FY 2004.  A study of 17 states’ budget actions in FY 2003 revealed that most 
states shied away from large cuts to eligibility and instead took actions to control 
prescription drug costs or hold provider rates constant (Fossett and Burke 2003). 
(1) Benefit Cuts:  A closer examination of benefit cuts in FY 2004 shows that most states 
targeted cuts at particular services—with some types of services and populations being 
hit more often than others. For instance, specialized services—such as dentists, 
podiatrists, chiropractors and therapists were more likely to be cut.  Interestingly, many 
states that cut these benefits in FY 2003 restored them FY 2004 (Smith, et al.  2003, p. 
20).  For instance, Kansas restored vision, audiology and diapers, while Massachusetts 
restored Medicaid coverage of orthotics and prosthetics.   
(2) Eligibility Cuts:  Similar to changes in benefits in FY 2004, several states not only cut 
eligibility but many also restored or added new categories of eligibility in FY 04. For 
instance, Illinois added children with family incomes up to 200 percent of the federal 
poverty level to SCHIP, as well as adding certain parents and seniors to the Medicaid 
program. New York added a buy-in program for the working disabled, while Oregon 
expanded SCHIP from 185 percent to 200 percent. Some states did cut back eligibility.  
For instance, Massachusetts tightened eligibility for disability, capped enrollment for 
some populations and eliminated benefits for Special Status Immigrants (Smith, et al. 
2003; see Appendix I).  Minnesota rolled back a recent eligibility expansion of the 
federal poverty level requirement (from 170 percent federal poverty level 150 percent) 
and reduced newborn eligibility from 24 to 12 months.  Even with these “cuts,” one could 
argue that the impact on nonprofits providers was minimal—since most states had 
recently expanded eligibility to new categories. In fact, given the fiscal situation of states, 
it is surprising that so many were able to maintain the eligibility expansions that were 
common in the late 1990s and 2000.  
(3) Provider cuts:  The most broad-based actions taken by states to control costs and 
most likely to impact nonprofits, were cuts to provider payments. The amount that 
nonprofit health care providers receive from government varies. For instance, some 
hospitals receive a substantial amount of money from government while others do not. 
Recent changes to provider payments ranged from substantial rate cuts to less drastic 
measures such as not implementing planned payment increases. Here are the actions that 
were taken by states to change provider payments in FY 2004: 
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1. Managed Care Organizations:  Rates were cut or unchanged in 19 states, 
including five states that cut rates and 14 states that froze rates.  
2. Nursing Homes:  Six states cut and 13 states froze rates.  
3. Hospitals:  Ten states cut and 22 states froze hospital payment rates. Hospital 
rates were actually increased in 22 states in FY 2003 and in 19 states in FY 2004.  
4. Physicians:  Three states cut and 35 states froze physician rates. Physician rates 
were increased in 11 states in FY 2003, and again in 11 states in FY 2004.  
It appears that the budget action that was most common was to leave rates unchanged, 
whether the rates were for managed care organizations, nursing homes, hospitals, or 
physicians. Also interesting is the fact that many providers received increases in their 
rates in both FY 2003 and FY 2004. Also, hospitals, which include a large number of 
nonprofits, fared relatively well in both FY 2003 and FY 2004 considering the fiscal 
situation of many states. For states that did cut provider rates, it is difficult to discern 
whether or not nonprofit organizations will suffer more or less than for-profit providers. 
In some states, cuts to provider payments may impact only certain types of providers—
such as dentists—whereas in other states, cuts in provider payments could impact 
hospitals or a range of therapy providers. The distribution of nonprofit providers and the 
services they deliver also varies from state to state, again making it difficult to determine 
the precise impact of provider cuts.  
Medicaid has withstood major cuts in most states, and most evidence suggests that the 
nonprofit health care organizations that draw on Medicaid dollars have as well.  
Medicaid’s robustness may be due to a number of factors:  the high matching rate for 
Medicaid, which makes it undesirable for states to cut; the strong and organized 
constituency of Medicaid providers and populations that rely upon Medicaid money that 
were successful at abating cuts; and the perception of “health care” as a positive 
government program as opposed to other social assistance programs seen as less 
desirable.  As Medicaid has become a larger part of state budgets and eligibility has been 
expanded, the number of people receiving benefits or business from the program’s 
existence has grown, making program cuts more difficult—perhaps leaving fewer 
resources for other nonprofit social service providers.   
Other Social Programs 
 
We do not have state and local spending data on the multitude of social programs in 
which nonprofits participate, but we can put the developments we have discussed above 
in a fuller context by examining how important federal intergovernmental grant programs 
have fared in recent years.  Only a few have been selected for trends and differences 
across states of different fiscal capacity.  These programs typically have extensive 
participation by nonprofit organizations in their administration: 
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1. Head Start.  This early childhood development program targets poor preschool 
children.  It has a funding ceiling.  Eighty percent of its funding comes from the 
federal government.  Many of its service providers are nonprofits. 
2. Social Services Block Grant.  SSBG (or Title XX of the Social Security Act) is a 
capped entitlement program, with each state entitled to a share of the funds based 
on population.  States apply the funds to a wide range of goals and activities, 
including preventing child abuse, providing child care, and offering community 
or home-based care for the elderly and disabled.  Actual spending by states may 
vary on a per capita basis because states differ in how they spend the monies 
across years and how much (if any) they transfer TANF money to SSBG 
programs.  Many if not most of the providers are nonprofits. 
3. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration.  This agency of the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services supports the Mental Health and 
Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Block Grant Programs, which 
encourage states to address substance abuse prevention, addiction treatment, and 
mental health services.  Many of the service providers are nonprofits.  For 
example, in a 2002 survey of facilities providing substance abuse treatment, 61 
percent of the facilities were nonprofits, followed by private for-profits (25 
percent), and state and local governments (11 percent) (Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies 2003). 
4. Emergency Shelter and Homeless Assistance.  Funds are distributed by formula 
and competition and may be used for a variety of housing activities, supported on 
a short-term, emergency basis or on a more permanent basis, including 
acquisition, rehabilitation, new construction of facilities, tenant rental assistance, 
and supportive services.  Although data on providers are scarce, many would 
appear to be nonprofits. 
5. Community Development Block Grant.  This is a federal entitlement program in 
which funds are allocated to states and local governments to provide decent 
housing, a suitable living environment, and expanded economic opportunities for 
low- and moderate-income families.  This is one of the most flexible funding 
programs.  Nonprofits can apply to their local government for CDBG funds. 
6. Employment and Training Administration.  This program provides job training 
and employment services for adults, youth, and displaced workers.  Many 
providers of these services are nonprofits. 
Figure 7 shows the average per capita funding levels of these programs across the four 
fiscal capacity quartiles.  The funding only includes the federal dollars (dominant or 
exclusive among these programs) and covers 1998 through 2002. 
Even a cursory review of these programs suggests that they are not likely to compensate 
for the problems faced by social assistance nonprofits in states with low fiscal capacity.  
Among these six, Head Start is the only program or group of programs that (1) has grown 
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Figure 7.  Selected Federal Intergovernmental Grants to State and Local Governments, 
By State Fiscal Capacity:  1998, 2000, and 2002 
 
Points are Averages (Means) for Each Federal Fiscal Year and for  Each Quartile of States  
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Programs included above: 
(1) Head Start 
(2) Social Services Block Grant 
(3) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Admn 
(4) Emergency Shelter and Homeless Assistance 
 
(5) Community Development Block Grant 
(6) Employment and Training Administration 
 
SOURCE:  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU.  FEDERAL AID TO 




substantially in funding since 1998 and (2) provides largely equivalent per capita funding 
to poor and rich states.  SSBG provides roughly similar levels of funding across states of 
different fiscal capacity (though there is some tilt toward the richer ones, probably as they 
have built up greater reserves over the years and transferred more money from TANF).  
However, the program has lost considerable value even in nominal terms since 1998.  
Interestingly, as the program has become smaller in recent years, states have put a greater  
share of the money into child welfare (especially protective) services and less into day 
care—perhaps indicating a triage effect (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 
Administration for Children and Families, Office of Community Services 2003:105). 
The federal aid programs provided by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services 
Administration have increased in value in recent years, but the greatest increases by far 
have occurred in states with higher fiscal capacity.  Emergency Shelter and Housing 
Assistance, already a small program, has grown very little overall and not at all in the 
states with low fiscal capacity.   The Community Development Block Grant decreased 
substantially in nominal terms among the poorest states between 1998 and 2002; states 
with the highest fiscal capacity experienced an increase in value between 2000 and 2002.  
Employment and Training Administration programs experienced a similar pattern, with 
states with the highest fiscal capacity seeing the greatest increases in recent years.  At 
least among these programs, federal funding has not mitigated the squeeze faced by 
nonprofit service organizations unable to tap into Medicaid. 
Conclusions and Implications 
Rather than a uniform impact, we found an increasingly divided sector, both 
geographically and functionally, in the effects of state fiscal problems on nonprofits 
involved in social programs.  One division was between nonprofits that can access 
Medicaid funds and those that cannot.  Medicaid spending has grown substantially in 
nearly all states—and it is continuing to grow in the first years after the recession.  By 
contrast, funding streams outside of the health area showed slower and more varied 
growth before the recession, and parts of the nonhealth social services budget have either 
been cut or appear to be quite vulnerable. 
A second and related division was between rich and poor states.  It is true that wealthy 
states saw steeper drops in tax revenues at the start of the decade, and that most of the 
nonprofits in the health and social assistance area were located in such states.  However, 
several factors mitigated the effects of state fiscal problems on nonprofits in states with 
high fiscal capacity.  The declines in revenue among these states were in part attributable 
to the extraordinary growth in revenues among such states in the 1990s, as their income 
tax systems reaped the benefits of unprecedented growth in capital gains.  Indicators of 
needs, such as cash assistance rolls, did not rise as fast in wealthy states as elsewhere.  
Nonprofits in states with high fiscal capacity were less dependent on government for 
revenues.  Finally, the human service budgets of wealthy states were more balanced 
across health and nonhealth expenditures, perhaps reflecting the larger federal grants that 
such states received under TANF and other nonhealth programs likely to involve 
nonprofit service providers. 
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By contrast, states with low fiscal capacity have seen significant increases in human 
needs, putting pressures on nonprofits as well as governments.  Poor states have not 
benefited in recent years from fiscal dividends generated by declines in cash assistance 
rolls.  Instead, their cash assistance rolls have bottomed out or begun to creep back up.   
At the same time, Medicaid spending in the poor states has grown just as fast—in many 
cases, faster—than health spending in much wealthier states.  Medicaid has thus become 
an even larger part of poor states’ social program budgets in recent years, and the 
program’s importance for funding a wide variety of services and major institutions in 
these states have made it even more difficult to control.  Since there is little to cut in these 
poor states in the cash assistance area, the only place left to make reductions during a 
fiscal crisis is in the many services and in-kind benefits outside the health area.  Such cuts 
could have a particularly harsh effect on nonprofits in poor states since such 
organizations rely more on government sources of revenue to for financial support. 
Through FY 2003, there remained enough slack in the system (such as TANF surpluses) 
to alleviate the severity of this budgetary logic.  But if state fiscal pressures and spending 
dynamics continue, we would expect to see major losses in government support among 
non-health nonprofits in poor states. 
Unfortunately, despite recent increases in state revenues (Jenny 2003), these fiscal 
pressures and spending trends on human service spending will probably continue for 
some years.  Spending pressures outside of human services have shown little signs of 
weakening:  Education expenditures, for example, have been exempted from interim cuts 
in many states even as recently as early 2003, and pressures to keep up such spending 
will probably continue as more attention is given to student test scores. 
Also, sales taxes may be depressed for some years as consumption, which has grown 
faster than income in recent years, resumes a growth rate more in line with income.  Sales 
taxes also face the long-run problems of taxing services and internet commerce, both 
growing components of the economy (Boyd 2003; Lav 2003).  Because states with low 
fiscal capacity rely heavily on consumption taxes, these problems may exacerbate the 
fiscal challenges facing poor states. 
Nor are increases in Medicaid spending likely to be curtailed unless states make 
unprecedented reductions in eligibility and coverage. As Boyd argues: 
A major looming risk to Medicaid is that the cost of long-term care, hospital care, 
prescription drugs and other expenditures that are particularly important for the 
elderly will rise as the population ages.  Medicaid expenditures per elderly 
beneficiary are more than three times as large as expenditures for the non-elderly. 
. . .  [A]bout three-quarters of projected growth in Medicaid expenditures is 
attributable to rising costs of care for the aged and disabled [2003]. 
These effects, Boyd goes on to say, will first hit many southern and western states, many 
of which have low fiscal capacity. 
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Finally, a number of federal policy changes aggravate these fiscal problems.  Recent 
federal tax cuts have reduced state revenues “because of linkages between federal and 
state tax codes” (Lav 2003:1).  Unfunded mandates are being imposed on the states, 
including homeland security and education requirements.  And federal health policies 
have encouraged cost-shifting from Medicare, which is fully funded by the federal 
government, to the Medicaid program, especially for low-income elderly and disabled 
people (Lav 2003:2-3). 
If these or other factors sharpen the division between rich and poor states in their human 
service budgets—particularly outside the health area—parts of the nonprofit sector may 
become more concentrated geographically.  It is possible that rather than complementing 
the public sector service system, distribution of private nonprofits would magnify 
differences among states with respect to their human service policies and budgets.  Such 
a development might also hurt the nonprofit sector in politics at the national level by 
reducing the number of members of Congress representing districts or states where 
nonprofit service organizations are diverse, plentiful, and employ many citizens. 
These trends may also produce other changes among nonprofits.  Barriers to entry are 
high for organizations wanting to access Medicaid funds—the program generally requires 
considerable professionalism in service providers and their staff—and to the extent that it 
becomes the major source of funding for nonprofits, more voluntaristic, less formal 
organizations will need to rely more on private funding, if funding can be obtained at all.  
Many faith-based organizations, in particular, would have limited opportunities in 
Medicaid-dominated systems.17 
Many questions emerge from this study that are worth exploring in future analyses: 
1. Micro-level choices about budget priorities:  Much more research could be done 
on the characteristics of programs and their providers that are critical in state 
budget decisions about which services to cut and which services to sustain.  We 
noted that a crucial element for the survival of a program may be a logically tight 
linkage to a core constituency, one that the state or agency is mandated to serve or 
that directly and immediately affects performance requirements.  But for a 
systematic comparison of these choices across states, field research is needed.  
The research could also explore the relative weights of fiscal funding formulas, 
the perceived human stakes in programs (e.g., some programs involve life-and-
death issues, such adult and child protection programs, while many do not), 
agency reputations for good or bad management, and many other factors. 
2. Nonprofit strategies and adaptations:  Once these choices are understood, 
including their variation from state to state, we can then develop better predictions 
about which programs are more likely to be vulnerable to economic cycles and 
which programs are more likely to survive. These insights ought to help nonprofit 
advocacy in how to structure and relate programs to constituencies and 
performance requirements.  But the insights can be further developed by an 
                                                 
17 The authors thank Jim Fossett of the Rockefeller Institute and SUNY-Albany for these points. 
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analysis that focuses on how health and nonhealth nonprofits have adapted to and 
otherwise dealt with the fiscal crisis and the trends described in this paper.  The 
study could examine advocacy tactics as well as longer-run organizational 
strategies, such as the use of institutional mergers or other cooperative 
arrangements across the health-nonhealth divide to help nonprofits smooth 
expected resource flows over time.  
3. Tracking federal and state spending, by state and perhaps by major city, in ways 
convenient to nonprofits in the human services area:  The enormous state 
variations in what they spend on different social service functions are not captured 
well by the highly aggregated U.S. Census Bureau categories or the highly 
complex and varied administrative data on individual programs.  A study that 
develops, in close cooperation with nonprofits, a classification system for state-
level expenditures that can be updated with available administrative data could be 
quite useful for nonprofit advocates, federal and state officials, journalists, and 
policy analysts.  It would especially useful if the study formulates a business plan 
for organizing and supporting the updating of such data on an annual basis and for 
making the information easily accessible to such different audiences (as the 
Rockefeller Institute is already doing with many data sets in its Gateway to State 
and Local Information Project; see http://stateandlocalgateway.rockinst.org/).  As 
part of this initial study, the work begun in this paper could be expanded to 
include a wider range of human service programs to see a more complete and 
detailed picture of recent and long-run trends and state variations in human 
service spending.  Also, since the Gateway Project is planning to track the 
economic conditions and finances of large cities, where many nonprofits operate, 
this monitoring could be expanded to include major municipalities. 
4. Understanding the effects of private sources of funding:  Our work has focused on 
the changes and variations in public spending for human services.  We have not 
examined the question of whether and how private giving reinforces or helps to 
compensate for these patterns.  For example, we have not examined the question 
of whether private giving has followed the same trend toward health needs and 
away from nonhealth supports.  Nor do we know whether or not the private giving 
shifts toward programs or services that are most vulnerable to public cuts.  Some 
interesting work has been done on how private charitable giving is distributed 
across states.  Dan Rygorsky and Dick Winters found that, contrary to the 
“crowding out” thesis, states that were more generous in their public programs 
also had citizens who were more generous with charitable contributions to human 
service organizations (2002).  This finding may imply that states with low fiscal 
capacity (and thus less likely to support generous public programs) do not tend to 
generate high levels of voluntary contributions.  But much more research on these 
issues remains to be done, including analyses that distinguish between private 
funds from different sources (such as foundations as opposed to individuals) and 
between different needs (such as health vs. nonhealth programs). 
5. Structural responses:  We do not know whether the fiscal crisis has led to 
intensified efforts at privatization, or a pulling back of functions from nonprofits 
 37
or for-profits.  Some states may attempt to save money by privatizing functions, 
while others may decide that they must perform functions “in house” to sustain a 
basic level of staffing in their agencies.  In our 2001-02 TANF field research, for 
example, one of Missouri’s first responses to budget cutbacks was to eliminate 
contracts for case management services and perform all such services with state 
employees.  Whether privatization efforts are being renewed, expanded, 
eliminated, or added—and whether such efforts differ from those launched a few 
years ago under very different economic conditions—could be a very useful study 
for nonprofits.  The study might also explore whether other arrangements are 
being developed between public and private agencies, such as greater efforts at 
local coordination of activities or even joint public and private initiatives. 
This state fiscal crisis follows in the wake of enormous changes in social programs and 
federalism.  Policymaking and budgetary power have been devolved down to states and 
localities.  Spending has shifted away from cash assistance and toward a complex array 
of services.  Service delivery systems and sometimes major public administrative 
functions have been privatized.  Medicaid coverage has been greatly expanded and the 
program has become of critical importance to a wide variety of health needs and 
industries.  These and other changes have fundamentally altered the competition for 
resources for social programs in the states, alterations that nonprofits should understand 
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State Quartile Rankings, 
Based on Per Capita Personal Income, 
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st 2nd 3rd 4th 
1st 
AL, AK, ID, 
KY, LA, MS, 
MO, NM, ND, 
SC, UT, WV
SD   
2nd OK 
AZ, IN, IA, 
ME, MO, NC, 
TN, TX, VT, 
WY 
GA, NE  
3rd  KS, OR 
FL, MI, OH, 
PA, RI, VA, 
WI 




























4th   AK, DE, HI, NV 
CA, CT, DC, 
IL, MD, MA, 
NH, NJ, NY 
 
 
 1st  = lowest per capita personal income 
 4th = highest per capita personal income 
 
 
